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We are becoming more and more aware that convergence between country’s income levels is far from
obvious. Empirical observation has forcefully shown that rich countries are becoming richer, while poor
ones are not able to catch up. For example, Jones [23] ﬁnds that the world income distribution changed
from a somewhat normal distribution shape towards a twin-peak shape. Even more disturbing, the key
results from the recent empirical evidence suggest that the distribution of country’s income diverges into
rich and poor, whereas the group of middle-income countries vanishes (Azariadis [1], [2], Quah [34],
[35], Barro and Sala-i-Martin [6]). We then provide new answers to the following two questions: One,
what can be a potential source of these twin-peaks? Two, why were some of the countries that were
believed to belong to the group of low steady state countries (like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, etc.) able
to reach a convergence path which led them to a high steady state?
Theoretical models have attempted to draw some conclusions on the possible sources of these twin-
peaks of economic growth. These models have either built on non-convexities in technologies to arrive
at multiple steady states (Azariadis and Drazen [3]) or on incomplete markets (Durlauf [14], Galor and
Zeira [21], Quah [34]). A review of the models and sources of twin-peaks can be found in Azariadis [2].
In this article we propose endogenous discounting as another potential source of the twin-peaks of eco-
nomic growth. Speciﬁcally, we argue that wealth affects the discount rate by proposing that this is a
shortcut for suggesting that wealthier countries have better health standards (Case et al. [8], Pritchett
[33]) and better insurance markets (Caroll [9], Banerjee and Newman [4]), all of which generally affects
the agent’s discount rate negatively (Frederick et al. [20]). We thus propose that wealth is assumed to af-
fect the level of the discount rate negatively. This leads to a departure from the time-additive framework
of Koopmans [26] to the recursive framework poineered by Uzawa [39].
There exist now an increasing number of endogenous discounting models, which however (nearly exclu-
sively) have consumption as the source of endogenity (e.g. Becker and Mulligan [7], Epstein and Hynes
[15], Obstfeld [30], Das [10], Drugeon [13]). Two articles which investigates a decreasing discount rate
1endogenized via consumption are Drugeon [13] and Das [10]. They suggest the possibility of multiple
steady states without deriving conditions and without further analysis. As far as the author is aware,
the endogenous discounting literature has therefore not yet dealt with the existence and implications of
multiple steady states thoroughly enough.
We derive the sufﬁcient condition for the existence of multiple steady states and show that, given the
conditions are satisﬁed, three steady states can exist, two of which are stable. One of these will be a
low-wealth, and the other a high-wealth steady state. Furthermore, we are also able to show that the
group of middle-wealth countries is at an instable steady state and will therefore vanish and converge
to either of the two high- or low-wealth steady states. Hence, discounting endogenized via wealth can
provide another explanation for the development of the twin-peaks of economic growth.
We answer our second question by demonstrating how improvements in technology can help avoid the
twin-peaks. This result ought to be particularly interesting for the case of developing countries.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some empirical evidence for an effect of wealth
on the discount rate. Section 3 introduces the model. In Section 4 we solve the model and give the
sufﬁcient condition for multiple steady states. We also derive the stability conditions. Section 5 assesses
the effect of improvements in technology on the twin-peaks and Section 6 concludes.
2 Wealth as a source of endogenous discounting?
Our treatment of wealth here will be based upon a broad view of wealth by taking a combination of
physical capital and human capital (see e.g. Mankiw [27], Barro and Sala-i-Martin [6]). This allows for
a wider applicability of the model.1 As the empirical evidence is rather extensive, we shall only present
a selection here. For a more thorough review of empirical evidence on the wealth channel the reader is
referred to Schumacher [37].
1For an endogenous discounting model which separates human capital from physical capital see Fall and Schumacher [17].
2FieldingandTorres[19]estimatetherelationshipbetweenwealth, healthandeducationfor41developing
countries. Their measure of wealth is particularly useful here, as it is based upon a wider measure of
wealth than prior empirical analysis that only refers to income. They build an index of wealth including
variables like electricity supply, number of radios, TVs or cars, access to ﬂush toilet, etc. They use this
to estimate that improvements in physical and human wealth lead to lower mortality rates. Their results
are robust even across countries, pointing at a uniform effect of the variables in question.
This ﬁnding seems now widely accepted in the literature. Grossman and Kaestner [22] as well as Gross-
man [2003] review the literature on the relationship between human wealth and health. Basically, the
variable which has the highest correlation with health is human wealth. Elias [16] estimates the magni-
tude of this effect by relating the death rates to the educational attainments for the USA for white males.
From the 45 to 64 years old with less than 12 years of schooling, the death per 100,000 inhabitants were
1,304 in comparison to 510 deaths for the ones with more than 13 years of schooling. Those ﬁndings
seem robust over time. Kitagwa and Hauser [25] utilize data from the 1960 Census Records for the USA
and even after controlling for income, they ﬁnd that human wealth has a strong negative relationship with
mortality rates. These results are conﬁrmed by Feldman et al. [18], Pappas et al. [31], Preston and Elo
[32], Richard and Barry [36].
Wealth as a source of endogenous discounting has also been proposed by Becker and Mulligan [7] as well
as Deaton and Paxson [12], who, respectively, show that ﬁnancial assets and human capital inequality
grow as cohorts age, interpreted as a sign that either affects preferences. This also helps to shed light on
the empirical observation that households with similar lifetime incomes hold very different amounts of
wealth at retirement. These results are interpreted by Becker and Mulligan [7] as a potential consequence
of endogenous time preference.
Overallitseemsthatthereareconsistentreasonsforwealthasasourceofendogenousdiscounting, where
wealth affects the discount rate negatively. We shall now turn to the model to assess the implication of
this empirically-based extension.
33 The Model
The model is based on an inﬁnitely-lived agent approach where the agent obtains utility from consump-
tion. In addition, his wealth affects the discount rate negatively. Then, wealth can be accumulated
by investing but is reduced by consumption and constant depreciation. The inﬁnitely-lived agent then







       
       
˙ k(t) = f(k(t)) − c(t) − δk(t), ∀t
˙ θ(t) = ρ(k(t)), ∀t
k(t) ≥ 0, c(t) ≥ 0, ∀t,
withk(0) given.
(1)
We make use of the following assumptions.
(A1) We impose that the production function f : R+ → R+ follows standard assumptions of concavity,
such that f(k) ≥ 0, f(0) = 0, f0(k) > 0, f00(k) < 0, with limk→0 f0(k) = ∞, and limk→∞ f0(k) = 0.
We also assume that the function is invertible, such that f−1 exists. We deﬁne ¯ k as the level of k which
solves f(k) = δk, and ˜ k as the level of k that solves f0(k) = δ.
(A2) The utility function u : R+ → R+ is at least twice continuously differentiable with u0(c) > 0,
u00(c) < 0, ∀c, and limc→0 u0(c) = ∞. The constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function has
the functional form of u(c) = c1−σ
1−σ , with σ ≥ 0.
The assumption u0(0) = ∞ allows to concentrate on interior solutions only. It corresponds to the
assumption that at least a minimum amount of consumption is required for the continuation of the gen-
erations. The requirement of a positive domain for felicity is necessary for intuitive results, as shown in
Schumacher [37]. The basic reasoning is that a policy maker who can choose the level of the discount
rate will always wish to increase it in case felicity is negative, as this then improves overall utility. To
avoid this counterintuitive situation we impose positive felicity throughout.
(A3)Wetakeρ(k) : R+ → R+ andC1 withρ0(k) < 0andρ00(k) > 0, whereweimposelimk→∞ ρ(k) >
40.2
The assumptions underlying the behaviour of the discount rate have been motivated in the previous
section. Deﬁning the optimization problem by introducing the discount factor as another constraint
allows the Hamiltonian to be independent of time which greatly simpliﬁes the analysis.
4 Solving the Model
The Hamilton of the above system writes
H = u(c(t))e−θ(t) + λ(t)[f(k(t)) − c(t) − δk(t)] − µ(t)ρ(k(t)). (2)
The Pontryagin necessary conditions for optimality are
u0(c(t))e−θ(t) = λ(t), (3)
λ(t)[f0(k(t)) − δ] − µ(t)ρ0(k(t)) = −˙ λ(t), (4)
−u(c(t))e−θ(t) = ˙ µ(t), (5)
lim
t→∞
H(t) = 0, (6)
where equation (6) gives the transversality condition of the system.3 As the Hamiltonian is autonomous
we know that ∂H
∂t = 0. Given the transversality condition limt→∞ H(t) = 0, this gives us that the
optimized H∗(t) = 0, ∀t. Transforming the Pontryagin necessary conditions from (3) till (5) and disre-
garing time subscripts for convenience, plus making use of H∗(t) = 0, ∀t, we can derive the following
2Speciﬁc functional form could be ρ(k) = ¯ ρe
−βk or ¯ ρ/(1 + βk), where β > 0, ρ > 0.
3For this kind of transversality condition, see Michel [29].
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˙ k = f(k) − c − δk. (8)





< 0, and n(k) =
u0(c)2−u00(c)u(c)
u0(c)2 > 0.
Proposition 1 Sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of multiple steady states are given by ∃k < ˜ k such
that f00(k) > ρ0(k) + m(k)
u(c)
u0(c) + [f0(k) − δ]
ρ0(k)










Proof 1 See Appendix.
The ﬁrst part of the sufﬁcient condition is a requirement on the slope of the production function and a
necessary conditionfor a low steadystate. The second part isa sufﬁcient conditionfor a high steady state.
In combination, both conditions are sufﬁcient for the existence of the three steady states. We denote the
steady states as 0 < kl < km(< ˜ k) < kh(< ¯ k). In effect, our conditions for multiple equilibria are
quite strong, as they restrict the km steady state to be to the left of ˜ k. It is possible to provide a set of
sufﬁciency conditions which are less restrictive, but at the cost of tractability without changing the main
results of the model.
Given the conditions for multiple equilibria are fulﬁlled we are able to characterize the dynamic be-
haviour of the curves in a Phase-Diagram, where we take the case of complex dynamics for the km
steady state. This situation is depicted in Figure 1.
We are now going to derive the arrows for the Phase-Diagram, making use of equations (7) - (8). If (c,k)
is above the ˙ k = 0 line, then f(k) − δk − c < 0 and hence ˙ k < 0, for (c,k) below the ˙ k = 0 we have
4The case of unique steady state has been treated in Schumacher [37].
6Figure 1: Saddle path dynamics
˙ k > 0. For (c,k) under the ˙ c = 0 line, we have ˙ c < (>)0 if f00(k) − ρ0(k) < (>)m(k)
u(c)
u0(c) + [f0(k) −
δ]
ρ0(k)
ρ(k) n(k). When we look at the conditions for multiple equilibria, we exactly notice that ˙ c < 0 for the
low and high steady states, but ˙ c > 0 for the middle steady state. Hence we can draw the arrows as in
Figure 1 and notice that the low and the high steady state are stable, whereas the middle one is instable.
Furthermore, from the subsequent analysis we will obtain that for some conditions, the middle steady
state will have complex dynamics.
In addition, conditions for the dynamics can be derived locally, from linearizing the system around the
steady states. When one linearizes the dynamical system around the non-trivial steady states, {cl,kl},










f00(k) − ρ0(k) − m(k)
u(c)










denoted by λ1,2. As the trace is Tr(J) = λ1 + λ2, and the determinant is Det(J) = λ1λ2, it sufﬁces to
show that the trace is positive and the determinant is negative. We can thus show that the trace of this
matrix is given by Tr(J) = ρ(k) > 0, while the determinant is negative if






(f0(k) − δ)n(k). (10)
From the sufﬁcient conditions for the multiple equilibria we know that this condition does not hold for the
middle steady state, which is thus instable. But we know that it holds for the low and high steady states,
which thus implies that they are saddle path stable. Complex dynamics arise if Tr(J)2 < 4Det(J).
As Det(J) < 0 for the low and high steady state, this excludes the possibility of complex dynamics









ρ(k) (f0(k) − δ)

.
From Schumacher [37] we know that following the saddle path leads to an optimal decision.5
The multiplicity of steady states occurs because when an economy is very poor then, ﬁrstly, increases
in consumption are necessary for survival (u0(0) = ∞), and secondly the agents are so impatient that
the preferences are nearly exclusively directed towards today, implying that most wealth will be directly
consumed. For k > km however, this implies that overall wealth has already been built up sufﬁciently
in order to incorporate far-sighted goals, such that the discount rate is relatively low. For example, with
a low enough mortality rate agents will need to plan ahead carefully to the distant future, whereas a high
mortality rate (due to the various feedbacks in section 2 implies that agents don’t expect to become old
and thus do not plan ahead.
5This is despite the fact that the objective function is not concave in both its arguments. We did not impose the standard
Mangasarian requirement of negative utility, u(c) < 0, as in Obstfeld [30] and others, because it leads to counter-intuitive
implications. See Schumacher [37] for a discussion.
85 The effect of improvements in technology
As the Phase-Diagramm in Figure 1 shows, if the conditions for multiple equilibria are satisﬁed then
there exist three equilibria. One of these starts with a low level of capital, is stable and ends up with
a low level of wealth (kl), another starts with a medium level of capital, is instable and diverges (km).
The last one is a stable steady state with high wealth (kh). This corresponds to the recent twin-peaks
of economic growth hypothesis raised by researchers like Quah [34], Jones [23] and Azariadis [1]. We
can provide more foundation to our analysis with some comparative statics. If there is an exogenous
increase in total factor productivity (TFP) A, where we deﬁne f(k) ≡ Ag(k), then the steady state curve
of capital stock shifts upwards, whereas the one of consumption shifts down (see Figure 2). We take the

















The nominator of this equation is always positive. If the low and high steady states are saddle path stable
then we know that the denominator is positive, wherefore improvements in total factor productivity will
increase wealth, whereas for the medium steady state the denominator is negative, which necessarily
implies that the wealth of the medium steady state is reduced. The intuition is that if wealth is more
productive, then it is more efﬁcient to increase the level of wealth and thus to reduce the discount rate.
An exogenous increase of the marginal effect of wealth on the discount rate also shifts the steady state
consumption curve down and right, because it is then more efﬁcient to increase wealth to reduce the
discount rate than to increase consumption.
This result points at the potential of technology to overcome the twin-peaks and help convergence to-
wards the high steady state. Clearly, in recent years, some of the countries that were believed to belong to
the group of low steady state countries (South Korea, Taiwan, etc.) were able to reach a convergence path
which led them to a high steady state. It seems evident that this is due to improvements in technology.
9Figure 2: An exogenous shift in TFP
6 Conclusion
In this article we suggest that the discount rate should not be treated exogenously, but instead should
be able to vary. Speciﬁcally, we provide empirical evidence which suggests that the discount rate is a
negative function of a broad measure of wealth, encompassing physical as well as human wealth.
We then show that wealth as a source of endogenous discounting can be another explanation for the
twin-peaks of economic growth hypothesis. The twin-peaks of economic growth hypothesis (see Quah
[35]) suggests that rich countries become richer while poor ones stay poor, thus producing a twin-peaks
distribution of income.
We derive the sufﬁcient conditions for multiple equilibria and show that there will exist three equilibria,
two stable ones and one instable one. The two stable ones are the low-wealth and high-wealth equilibria,
whereas the instable equilibrium belongs to the middle-income group. We notice that this conforms
to recent empirical results from Quah [35] and Azariadis [2]. Whereas the current literature on twin-
peaks requires some non-concavity assumption in the production function, we are able to characterize
10endogenous discounting via wealth as another potential source of the twin-peaks.
We show that improvements in technology can help avoid the twin-peaks. This should provide some new
perspective for policy makers with respect to the debate on the development of nations.
7 Appendix: Sufﬁcient condition for multiple Steady States
We use the steady state equations






f(k) − δk = c.





G0(k) = f00(k) − ρ0(k) − m(k)
u(c)
u0(c) − [f0(k) − δ]
ρ0(k)
ρ(k) n(k), where c = f(k) − δk. We know that
limk→0 G(k) = ∞ and limk→¯ k G(k) = z, where z is a negative but ﬁnite number. Hence, the curve
G(k) starts from positive inﬁnity to negative ﬁnite for k = ¯ k. As each argument of G(k) is continuous,
we know that G(k) is continuous. A sufﬁcient condition for a low steady state is then that ∃k < ˜ k
such that G0(k) > 0 with G(k) < 0. A sufﬁcient condition for a high steady state is G(˜ k) > 0.
These conditions hold imply that ∃k < ˜ k such that f00(k) > ρ0(k) + m(k)
u(c)
u0(c) + [f0(k) − δ]
ρ0(k)
ρ(k) n(k)








u0(f(k)−δk).  We thus know that
0 < kl < km < ˜ k < kh < ¯ k.
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